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Abstract— In wireless ad hoc networks, the absence of any 
control on packets forwarding, make these networks vulnerable 
by various deny of service attacks (DoS). A node, in wireless ad 
hoc network, counts always on intermediate nodes to send these 
packets to a given destination node. An intermediate node, which 
takes part in packets forwarding, may behave maliciously and 
drop packets which goes through it, instead of forwarding them 
to the following node. Such behavior is called black hole attack. 
In this paper, after having specified the black hole attack, a 
secure mechanism, which consists in checking the good 
forwarding of packets by an intermediate node, was proposed. 
The proposed solution avoids the black hole and the cooperative 
black hole attacks. Evaluation metrics were considered in 
simulation to show the effectiveness of the suggested solution. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A wireless ad hoc network is a collection of nodes 
connected by wireless links. Although it offers the advantage of 
being easy to deploy, the wireless ad hoc network paradigm, 
characterized by the absence of any control at the routing 
operation or data forwarding, introduced truths problems of 
security making thus less powerful the operation of such 
network. 
Early conceived routing protocols suppose saint the 
environment in which the network is deployed [1]. However, 
that it is the contrary in practice, and it proves to be difficult the 
guarantee of the security within a network, where the medium 
of communication is open, a central authority of certification 
misses, what facilitates the interception, the modification or 
even the manufacture of packets so that then to inject them into 
the network, in order to disturb the correct operation or to make 
entirely non operational the network. Guarantee the security is 
not limited to ensure, individually, the following services: 
Participants authentification, data integrity and confidentiality, 
non repudiation, access control to the communication medium 
and anonymity. But also, how to put individual solutions 
together to produce a solution whose range will hold in account 
the beforehand listed considerations and requirements. The 
literature contains security solutions which are protocols whose 
originating objective was security, and other protocols 
conceived at the beginning without security like primary 
objective, and they were secured in improved versions because 
attacks of which they were victims. Obviously, security 
remains always an arising problem and the remedy is far from 
being found.  
Various attacks against wireless ad hoc networks can be 
conducted [1]. They are qualified passive ones, if they are 
limited to the listening of the network traffic to take note, or 
active if the traffic is modified by the intruder. Security attacks 
can be internal when the malicious node belongs to the 
network, or external if not. Deny of service attacks are easy to 
carry out, and difficult to detect. Their principle is the violation 
and the non respect of the network protocol specification and 
their finality is the disturbance of the correct network 
operation. The no relaying of the traffic (of control or data) by 
an intermediate node constitutes a behavioral deviation, whose 
consequence is the violation of the objective for which the 
network is deployed. Such malicious behavior is called the 
black hole attack. In this paper and after having specified how a 
black hole attack is conducted, a solution consisting in 
checking the good forwarding of the traffic by an intermediate 
node, was proposed. The solution is based on the well-known 
principle which is the Merkle tree [2], [4]. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
summarizes the related work, follow-up by a necessary 
background in section 3, then the black hole attack 
specification is presented in section 4 and detailed description 
of the suggested solution is the subject of section 5. Simulation 
and results are analyzed and discussed in section 6. The paper 
is achieved by a conclusion and our future work.  
II. RELATED WORK 
They did not have satisfied solutions to solve the black hole 
attack problem, what led researchers to be addressed to this 
attack to find remedies for it. In the literature, the black hole 
attack solutions can be solutions which are interested in the 
black hole attack acting in an individual manner or those which 
are interested in the cooperative black hole attack or general 
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security mechanisms being interested in others attacks in 
addition to the black hole attack. 
In [4], Hongsong et al. proposes an intrusion detection 
model to combat the black hole attack in AODV [5] routing 
protocol. In this model, a security agent, established by a 
hardware thread in network processor uses parallel 
multithreading architecture, try to detect two cases of figure of 
attack. Those exploiting AODV control messages RREQ 
(Route REQuest) and RREP (Route REPly). The agent 
monitors the RREQ-RREP messages at real-time and if any 
detection rule is violated, the black hole attack is detected and 
the malicious node is isolated and recorded to a black list. This 
solution requires a special material for its implementation. It is 
dedicated to AODV protocol and it considers only control 
messages, however that black hole attack can target data 
messages. Considering always AODV, authors of [6] try to 
detecting abnormality occurs during the black hole attack by 
defining a normal state from dynamic training data that is 
updated at regular time intervals. To express the state of the 
network, the following features are used: Number of sent out 
RREQ messages, Number of received RREP messages and the 
change of the sequence number value used by AODV to 
determine the route freshness degree. Through the simulation, 
this method shows significant effectiveness however a more 
processing overhead is needed for its implementation and 
consequently it can suffer from scalability problems. In [7], the 
authors are always interested in AODV and propose a solution 
in which the receiving node of RREP message compares the 
sequence number value with a dynamic updated threshold. If 
the sequence number value is found to be higher than the 
threshold value, the node is suspected to be malicious and it 
adds the node to the black list. Here still, except message 
RREP is controlled. It is necessary to hold in account also data 
packets because a black hole node can behave normally in the 
route establishment phase and maliciously in the data 
transmission phase. In more, the threshold considered can miss 
exactitude what brings back to false alarms. 
A cooperative black hole attack is when several malicious 
nodes work together as a group. To identify multiple black hole 
nodes acting in cooperation, Fu’s team, in [8], [9], proposes 
slightly modified AODV protocol by introducing Data Routing 
Information (DRI) table, that contains information on routing 
data packet from/through the node and cross checking process 
that determines the reliable nodes to discover secure paths from 
source to destination. In [10], authors propose an enhancement 
of the basic AODV routing protocol to combat the cooperative 
black hole attack. They use a structure, which they call fidelity 
table, wherein every participating node will be assigned a 
fidelity level that acts as a measure of reliability of that node. In 
case the level of any node drops to 0, it is considered to be a 
black hole node and is eliminated. In their approach, they 
assume that nodes are already authenticated which is a little 
strong assumption. Agrawal et al. [11] proposes a complete 
protocol to detect a chain of cooperating malicious nodes in an 
ad hoc network. The proposed protocol is based on sending 
equal and small sized blocks of data, and monitoring the traffic 
flow at the neighborhoods of both source and destination, then 
gathering results of monitoring by a trusted backbone network, 
with the little strong assumption that a neighborhood of any 
node has more trusted than malicious nodes. 
Other black hole attack solutions were summarized in [1] 
and dedicated solutions for securing particular routing 
protocols against all possible attacks, not only against the black 
hole, were proposed. SAR [12] and SEAD [13] are examples of 
such secure routing protocols. The watchdog and pathrater [14] 
mechanism is also proposed for mitigating misbehavior. The 
watchdog for identifying misbehaving nodes and the pathrater 
helps routing protocols avoid these nodes. This mechanism is 
functional only with nodes equipped by interfaces that support 
promiscuous mode operation.  
III. BACKGROUND 
Our solution is based on the principle of Merkle tree [2], [3] 
and uses the AODV [5] routing protocol like case of study, 
thus the knowledge of Merkle tree principle and AODV 
functioning is necessary. 
A. Merkle tree 
A Merkle tree is a binary tree in which, each leaf carries a 
given value and the value of an interior node (including the 
root) is a one-way hash function of the node’s children values. 
Figure 1 illustrates an example of a Merkle tree in which: 
• h denotes a one-way hash function. For example, the 
function SHA-1 [15].  
• || is the concatenation operator. 
• Values of leaves 1,2,4, respectively, are: h(a), h(b), 
h(c). 
• The value of the interior node 3 is: h(h(a)||h(b)) 
which is the hashing result of the concatenation of 
values of children 1 and 2. Idem for the node 5 
whose value is h(h(h(a)||h(b))||h(c)) and children 
are: 3 and 4.  
 
Figure 1.  Example of a Merkle tree 
B. AODV routing protocol 
AODV (Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector) [5] is a 
reactive routing protocol composed of two modules:  
• Route discovery module: To send data to a given 
destination D, the source node S consults its routing 
table. If it finds a valid entry (a route) towards this 
destination D, it uses it immediately, else it launches a 
route discovery procedure (see Figure 2.), witch 
consists in broadcasting, by the source node S, a route 
request (RREQ) message (containing amongst other 
information: destination’s address, destination’s 
sequence number) towards neighbors. When RREQ is 
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received by an intermediate node, this last consults its 
routing table to find a fresh route (the route is fresh if 
the sequence number of this route is larger than that of 
RREQ) towards the requested destination in RREQ. If 
such a route is found, a route reply (RREP) message is 
sent through the pre-established reverse route 
(established when RREQ pass through intermediate 
nodes) towards the source S. If the intermediate node 
does not find a fresh route, it updated its routing table 
and sends RREQ to these neighbors. This process is 
reiterated until RREQ reaches the destination node D. 
The destination node D sends RREP to S by using the 
pre-established reverse route. It should be noted that 
the source S can receive several RREP, it will choose 
that whose destination’s sequence number is larger, if 
destination’s sequence numbers of several RREP are 
equal, that of which the smallest hope counter will be 
selected. 
 
Figure 2.  Route discovery process of AODV 
• Route maintenance module: AODV uses Hello 
messages to maintain the connectivity between nodes. 
Each node periodically sends a Hello message to these 
neighbors and awaits Hello messages on behalf of 
these neighbors. If Hello messages are exchanged in 
the two directions, a symmetrical link between nodes is 
always maintained if no link interrupt occurs. The 
broken link can be repaired locally by the node 
upstream, else a route error (RERR) message is sent to 
the source S (see Figure 3.). This last can launch again, 
if necessary, the route discovery procedure. It should 
be noted that the link interrupt is the consequence of 
the mobility or the breakdown of nodes.  
 
Figure 3.  Route maintenance process of AODV 
IV. BLACK HOLE ATTACK SPECIFICATION 
In a black hole attack, the malicious node refuses to 
forward data packets to the following node in the route  
connecting a  given source and destination. To conduct its 
attack, the malicious node must initially belong to the data 
route, then it pass to the action which is the data dropping.   
According to the specification of the target routing protocol, 
the manner with which the malicious node fits in the data route 
differs. Since our case of study is the AODV protocol, we will 
see how a malicious node can make a success of its attack in 
AODV. 
Two kinds of black hole attack can be distinguished:  
• Internal black hole attack: The malicious node is an 
internal node which does not seek to fit in an active 
route between a given source and destination, and if the 
chance would have it, this malicious becomes element 
of an active data route, it will be able to conduct its 
attack as the transmission of the data starts.  This attack 
is internal because the malicious node belongs already 
to the data route. Here, there is no violation of AODV 
specification and the malicious node has anything to 
make to carry out with success its attack.  
• External black hole attack: The malicious node is an 
external node which seeks to fit in an active route. For 
that, it violates the routing protocol specification and 
executes the process schematized in Figure 4. and 
summarized in the following points:  
- The malicious node detects the existence of an 
active route and takes note of the destination 
address.   
- The malicious node prepares a route replay packet 
(RREP) in which: the destination address field is set 
to the spoofed destination address, the sequence 
number is set to a greatest value and the counter 
hope is set to a smallest value.  
- The malicious node sends this route reply RREP to 
the nearest intermediate node belonging to the real 
active route (not necessarily to the data source node 
himself).   
- The route reply RREP received by the intermediate 
node will be relayed through the preestablished 
inverse route towards the data source node.  
- The source node updates its routing table by the 
new information received in the route reply.  
- The source uses the new route to sending data.  
- The malicious node starts to drop the data in the 
route to which it belongs. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Black hole attack specification 
The malicious node M detects the existence of active route 
(S,A,E,D) between the source S and destination D. The 
malicious node M sends to the node A a route reply message 
(RREP) containing the spoofed destination address, a relatively 
large sequence number and a small hope count. The node A 
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forwards this route reply message to S. This last updates its 
routing table and considers the new route (S,A,M). The node S 
uses this route to send data and while arriving at M, these data 
will be quite simply dropped. Nodes source and destination 
will not be able any more to communicate in the presence of 
the black hole attack. 
V. OUR SOLUTION 
The table I contains the notations used to describe our 
solution. 
TABLE I.  NOTATIONS 
Notation Significance 
idi Identity of node i. 
Si Secret generated by node i. 
h One-way hash function. 
|| Concatenation operator. 
 
 In Figure 5, we consider a piece of network made up of 3 
nodes A, B and C. On this last, a Merkle tree is juxtaposed. We 
point out that our goal is to check that B conveys well, towards 
C, the traffic sent by A. 
 
Figure 5.  Basic principle of the solution, single black hole case 
Each node i holds the value h(idi||Si), i∈{A,B,C}. The 
transmitter node A has, in more, the value δ (value of the root 
of the Merkle tree). So that A checks that B forwards well the 
traffic to C, the node C sent the value λ (value held by C) to B 
and B, in turn, sent to A, β (value held by B) and λ.When both 
β and λ are received by A, the node A recalculates δ from α 
(value owned by A), β and λ, then compares the result with the 
value of δ already held, if equality, the node B routed out the 
traffic to C, otherwise, B is a black hole node. Obviously, to 
leading a black hole attack, the node B must generate the value 
λ which is impossible, because it does not know the C’s secret 
Sc.  
Nodes B and C can cooperate to conduct black hole attack, 
this is easy if C communicates to B its secret SC. To prevent 
such a scenario, the idea of the solution can be generalized as it 
is shown in Figure 6.  
When β, λ and ω are received by A, the node A recalculates 
ψ from α, β, λ and ω, then compares the result with the value 
ψ of already held, if equality, the route (A,B,C,D) is secured, 
otherwise, the route contains a black hole nodes. B and C 
cannot conduct a cooperative black hole attack because they do 
not know the secret SD held by D.  
 
Figure 6.  Basic principle of the solution, cooperative black hole case 
It is important to note that the secret Si is generated by node 
i independently of other nodes and this to prevent another node 
to replay the role of the node i.  
Once detected, the black hole node can be put in a black list 
to avoid it in all future communication and, if necessary, 
another discovery route operation can be started again. For the 
implementation of our solution, an initialization process is 
necessary. It enables to nodes to generate each one its secret 
and communicate the root value of the Merkle tree to the 
transmitter node (communicate the value δ to the node A in 
Figure 5).  
The gray hole attack is a variant of the black hole attack in 
which a malicious node, selectively, destroys packets of the 
traffic that passes through it. Our solution can easily be adapted 
to thwart such attacks. It is remarkable that this solution can be 
integrated in any routing protocol, at the time when its 
operation is not related to any specificity of a particular routing 
protocol. Obviously, the specification of the black hole attack 
is different from a routing protocol to another.  
VI. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS 
In the network of the Figure 7, we use a source data node, a 
destination data node and one or more black hole nodes chosen 
randomly among nodes of the network. OPNET Modeler 
version 11.5 [16] is used as a simulator. The table II contains 
the simulation parameters.   
TABLE II.  SIMULATION PARAMETRES 
Simulation parameter Value 
Nodes number 10 
Network size 1km*1km 
Simulation duration (sec) 600 
Packet Inter-Arrival Time (sec) exponential(1) 
Packet size (bits) exponential(1024) 
Transmit Power (watt) 0.0001 
Routing protocol  AODV 
Hash function SHA-1 
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Figure 7.  Network used in simulation 
In this section, we show the effect of the black hole attack 
on the network functioning in first place, and how our solution 
can neutralize such an attack in second. This, in the presence of 
one or more black hole attacks (cooperative black hole). For 
this, we consider the following metrics: 
• Traffic sent by the node source (packet/sec): indicate 
the number of packets/second sent by the source node. 
• Traffic received by the destination node (packet/sec): 
indicate the number of packets/second received by the 
destination node. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Traffic Sent & Traffic Received - Single Black hole 
Figure. 8 shows the traffic sent by the source node, the 
traffic received by the destination node without attack, the 
traffic received by the destination node in the presence of a 
single black hole node and the traffic received by the 
destination node when the solution is used. The traffic received 
by the destination node is null under the effect of the attack 
without using the solution, this is justified by the destruction of 
packets per black hole node. Under the effect of the solution, le 
black hole node is eliminated and the destination node receives 
normally the traffic.  
Figure 9. shows the simulation results in the presence of 
two malicious nodes cooperating together to conduct a black 
hole attack (cooperative black hole).  
 
Figure 9.  Traffic Sent & Traffic Received - Cooperative Black hole 
Our solution detects well the cooperative black hole attack 
but with a little time lag because the detection of the 
cooperative black hole attack requires more calculation than in 
the case of a simple black hole, then an alternative route is 
found to convey the traffic to the destination node. 
To evaluate the performance of our solution, we consider 
the following evaluation metrics:  
• End to end delay (sec): indicate the delay, in second, 
for sending a bit of the source node to the destination 
node.  
• Network load (bits/sec): indicate the traffic quantity, in 
bits/sec, in the entire network.  
 
Figure 10. and Figure 11. show, respectively, the end to end 
delay and the network load, in cases : without black hole 
attack, with black hole attack and solution, and cooperative 
black hole attack and solution.  
A very small time lag due to tests and calculations carried 
out by nodes, after which, the delay is stabilized and become 
almost identical in all scenarios, which shows that our solution 
does not influence the degradation of the network performance.  
A slight increase in the network load because of messages 
exchanged between nodes to communicate various hash values. 
More messages in the case of cooperative black hole, 
comparatively with the case of single black hole, which 
justified graphs pace in Figure 11.  
14 http://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/ 
ISSN 1947-5500 
(IJCSIS) International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security,  
Vol. 7, No. 1, 2010 
 
Figure 10.  End to end delay 
 
Figure 11.  Network load 
In the issue of these results, the network performance 
remains acceptable, if it is only a negligible variation in the end 
to end delay and a slight increase in the network load. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTUR WORK 
Ad hoc network security is a serious problem by which 
researchers were concerned. Several security solutions are 
suggested but perfect security is far from beings obvious. We 
focused in this paper to the black hole attack, which refuses to 
convey the traffic and drop it. After the black hole attack 
specification in an example of routing protocol (AODV), we 
proposed a solution, based on the principle of Merkle tree, for 
avoiding the black hole and the cooperative black hole attacks. 
Moreover, Gray hole, a variant of the black hole, can easily be 
detectable by our solution. Simulation results show well its 
effectiveness in the detection of such attacks and the slight 
influence of this solution on the network performance. It was 
announced that our solution is general and it is not dedicated to 
any
uate mechanisms which will make the 
solution more powerful. 
is paper and for pertinent criticisms and 
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